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THE FIRST EPSILON THEOREM IN PURE INTUITIONISTIC AND
INTERMEDIATE LOGICS
MATTHIAS BAAZ AND RICHARD ZACH
§1. Introduction. In 1921, Hilbert introduced the ε-calculus as a formalism
on which to build his proof-theoretic project. The ε-calculus was originally
introduced as a formalization of classical first-order logic. It can be seen as an
attempt to reduce proofs in first-order logic to proofs in propositional logic, where
the role of quantifiers is taken over by certain terms. In this light, quantifier
axioms and inferences are replaced by axioms about ε-terms (so-called critical
formulas), and the eigenvariable restrictions characteristic of quantifier inferences
are replaced by restrictions on substitutions, which are automatically satisfied
given the structure of ε-terms. In the presence of identity, the formalism is more
complicated, as axioms for identity have to be added to propositional logic.
Hilbert called the resulting system the “elementary calculus of free variables”—
essentially a formalism with predicates and terms, as well as open axioms for
identity, but without quantifiers.
The ε-operator is used to form terms from formulas (which may them-
selves contain ε-terms). If A(x) is a formula, then εxA(x) is an ε-term.
Existential quantification ∃xA(x) can then be expressed as A(εxA(x)), and
the characteristic axiom of ∃, viz., A(t) → ∃xA(x) becomes the critical for-
mula A(t) → A(εxA(x)). By duality, the universal quantifier is expressed as
A(εx ¬A(x)). The axiom for the universal quantifier, ∀xA(x)→ A(t), then be-
comes A(εx ¬A(x))→ A(t), which is the contrapositive of the critical formula
¬A(t)→¬A(εx ¬A(x)) belonging to ¬A(x). The standard ε-translation Aε of a
first-order formula A is the formula without quantifiers which results from A by
replacing ∀ and ∃ by ε-terms.
Hilbert proved two fundamental results about the ε-calculus:
1. The first ε-theorem: If A(~e) is derivable in the ε-calculus (~e a tuple of ε-
terms), then there are tuples terms ~t1, . . . , ~tn such that A(~t1)∨ . . .∨A(~tn)
is provable in the elementary calculus.
2. The second ε-theorem: If Aε is the standard ε-translation a first-order
formula derivable in the ε-calculus, A is derivable in first-order logic.
The first ε-theorem has two important consequences. The first consequence is
a conservativity result, which we may call the weak first ε-theorem: If A is ε-
free and derivable in the ε-calculus, it is derivable in the elementary calculus
of free variables (i.e., without critical formulas, indeed, without any use of ε-
terms). If identity is not present, this implies that the ε-calculus is conservative
over propositional logic for quantifier-free formulas. The second consequence
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is Herbrand’s theorem for existential formulas: If ∃~xA(~x) is provable in the ε-
calculus, then some disjunction A(~t1) ∨ . . . ∨ A(~tn) is provable in propositional
logic alone, i.e., is a tautology.
These results are obtained by manipulating derivations, i.e., by eliminating ε-
terms and critical formulas from derivations. The first and the second ε-theorem
are related, both conceptually and in Hilbert’s proofs, to Herbrand’s theorem.
According to it, for every prenex formulas in first-order logic there is a purely ex-
istential formula (with additional function symbols)—its Herbrand form—which
is provable iff the former is. A disjunction of the sort produced by the first
ε-theorem is called a Herbrand disjunction. It has the property that from it the
original formula can be proved in first-order logic. And in fact, this is how the
proof of the second ε-theorem proceeds: Suppose a prenex formula is provable in
the ε-calculus. From the proof we obtain a proof of its (purely existential) Her-
brand form. Now apply the first ε-theorem to obtain its Herbrand disjunction.
The Herbrand disjunction is provable in propositional logic alone, and from it
we can recover the original formula using only first-order logic without ε-terms
or critical formulas.1
Hilbert’s results make essential use of classical principles, especially the law of
excluded middle. The question naturally arises whether the results can also be
obtained for weaker logics, and whether the same proof methods can be used,
i.e., whether the use of excluded middle can be avoided. In order to to make
headway, we restrict our considerations to pure intermediate logics, i.e., logics
between intuitionistic and classical logic. Well-known examples are Jankov’s
logic of weak excluded middle and the Go¨del-Dummett logics of linearly ordered
Heyting algebras or Kripke frames. We make this restriction for two reasons.
One is that Hilbert’s methods rely essentially on the deduction theorem, and
this holds in intermediate logics but not in many other logics. The other is that
ε-calculi for intuitionistic and intermediate logics are of independent interest.
What is the effect of adding ε-operators to intermediate logics? When does the
first ε-theorem hold? When is the ε-calculus for a logic conservative over the
propositional base logic? We also, for the most part, discuss only pure logics, i.e.,
logics without identity, since identity results in much more complicated systems
and proofs, even already in the classical case.
In order to carry out this investigation, it is useful to introduce a dual τ -
operator which defines the universal quantifier. Whereas A(εxA(x)) translates
∃xA(x), A(τx A(x)) translates ∀xA(x). The corresponding critical formulas are
those of the form A(τx A(x))→A(t). Weakening the logic makes the addition of τ
necessary as the equivalence of ∀xA(x) and A(εx ¬A(x)) relies on the schema of
contraposition; the equivalence of ∀xA(x) and A(τx A(x)) does not. The system
resulting from a propositional intermediate logic L by adding ε- and τ -terms and
critical formulas is called the ετ -calculus for L.
It is well known that adding the ε-operator to intutionistic logic in a straight-
forward way is not conservative. Mints [1977], [1990] has investigated different
systems based on intuitionistic logic with ε-operators which are conservative and
1See Hilbert and Bernays [1939] for the first presentation of the ε-theorems, Avigad and
Zach [2019] for a survey, and Moser and Zach [2006] for a modern presentation.
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in which the ε-theorem holds. He allows the use of ε-terms only when ∃xA(x) has
been established; other approaches (e.g., Shirai [1971]) use existence predicates
to accomplish the same. We investigate the basic ετ -calculus without this as-
sumption; i.e., we treat the ετ -calculus syntactically as a calculus of (something
like) Skolem functions rather than semantically as a choice operator.
§2. Summary of Results. We establish the following main results:
1. In the ετ -calculus for an intermediate logic, all quantifier shift principles
are provable. Thus, the ετ -calculus is not conservative over an intermediate
predicate logic in which these principles are not provable (Proposition 4.1).
2. The ετ -calculus for any intermediate logic L is always a conservative exten-
sion of L. Hence, non-conservativity phenomena are restricted to first-order
formulas (Theorem 5.3).
3. The first ε-theorem holds only in finite-valued Go¨del logics (Theorems 6.2
and 9.14).
4. However, the weak first ε-theorem holds also in infinite-valued Go¨del-
Dummett logic LC (Theorem 9.15).
The results also apply to classical logic, of course, and give new information
about possible strategies for proving the first ε-theorem there.
We begin (Sections 3 and 4) by considering the differences in formulas provable
in a logic vs. those provable in the corresponding ετ -calculus. This is essentially
the question of whether the addition of ε- and τ -terms and critical formulas allows
the derivation (or requires the validity) of formulas not provable in the base logic.
In the classical case, it does not: the weak first ε-theorem implies conservativity
over propositional logic for quantifier-free formulas, and the second ε-theorem
implies conservativity for first-order formulas. These results hold also in the
presence of identity. However, the addition of ε- and τ -operators to intuitionistic
logic is not conservative. This is well known; we investigate in more detail
which intuitionistically invalid formulas are provable in ετ -calculi. We show
that quantifier shift schemas play a special role here (sentences which express
that quantifiers shift into or out of disjunctions, conjunctions, and conditionals).
All but three of these are valid in intuitionistic logic. The addition of ε-terms and
critical formulas results in the provability of the remaining three. Consequently,
no intermediate first-order logic in which one of these three quantifier shifts
is unprovable can have the second ε-theorem. This includes intuitionistic logic
itself, logics complete for non-constant domain Kripke frames, and infinite-valued
Go¨del-Dummett logic.
We show that conservativity for the propositional fragment does hold for all
intermediate logics (Section 5).2 The proof of this result does not need Hilbert’s
involved proof-theoretic methods and also applies to classical logic. This in itself
is a surprising result, even though the proof is very easy.
2Bell [1993], DeVidi [1995] have shown that it does not hold for derivations from theories
in intuitionistic logic when identity is present: the presence of a 6= b for constants a, b is
enough to derive De Morgan’s law from H with identity plus ε-terms and critical formulas.
Mulvihill [2015] gave another proof, not requiring identity, but other quantified axioms. Their
calculi differ somwhat from ours. See Section 14.
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Our main results concern the first ε-theorem for intermediate logics. We show
that whenever it holds, the underlying logic must prove (or validate) a sen-
tence Bm of the form
(A1 →A2) ∨ (A2 → A3) ∨ · · · ∨ (An → Am+1).
This means that very few intermediate logics satisfy the first ε-theorem. For
instance, they are not provable in intuitionistic logic, any logic complete for
Kripke frames with branching worlds, or in infinite-valued Go¨del-Dummett logic.
The only intermediate logics in which Bm are provable are the finite-valued Go¨del
logics (Section 6).
Provability of Bm is also a sufficient condition: We show that the first ε-
theorem holds whenever the underlying logic proves at least one Bm. The proof
follows the idea of Hilbert’s proof, but does not make use of excluded middle.
In order to establish the result, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the
proof of the first ε-theorem. We introduce the notion of an elimination set, that
is, a set of terms which can replace an ε-term in a proof and render the corre-
sponding critical formulas redundant using only the resources of the underlying
propositional logic.
We first discuss elimination sets for classical logic and excluded middle (Sec-
tion 7), and then for finite-valued Go¨del logic and the propositional principles
Bm (Section 8). If such elimination sets exist, the procedure given by Hilbert
and Bernays can be used for a proof of the first ε-theorem. By putting emphasis
on elimination sets we can also show that in logics in which the first ε-theorem
does not hold in general, it may still hold for formulas of a special form. This al-
lows us to show that the first ετ -theorem holds for negated formulas in Jankov’s
logic of weak excluded middle and in infinite-valued Go¨del logic. The weak
first ε-theorem, where the formula proved contains no ετ -terms, also holds for
infinite-valued Go¨del logic (Section 9).
The first ετ -theorem is closely related to Herbrand’s theorem. We discuss this
connection, as well as the second ετ -theorem, in Section 10.
In the case of some proofs, it is possible to eliminate ετ -terms in a simplified
way where the cases that require the presence of Bm do not arise. Although
we cannot give an independent characterization of the proofs or theorems for
which this is the case, the simplified procedure will sometimes terminate and
produce a Herbrand disjunction. Conversely, if a Herbrand disjunction exists,
there is always a proof of the original formula for which the procedure terminates
and produces the Herbrand disjunction (Section 11). This result sheds light on
the conditions under which (a version of) Hilbert’s method which uses principles
weaker than excluded middle produces a Herbrand disjunction. In fact, a similar
method can be used to give a partial ε-elimination procedure for number theory,
where linearity of the natural order of N plays a similar role as the schema of
linearity does in the case of logic (Section 12).
§3. ετ -Calculi for Intermediate Logics. An intermediate logic L is a set of
formulas that contains intuitionistic logicH and is contained in classical logic C,
and is closed under modus ponens and substitution. For intermediate predicate
logics, we also require closure under the universal and existential quantifier rules.
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Intermediate propositional logics have been investigated extensively since the
1950s. Intermediate predicate logics are comparatively less well understood;
however, they constitute an active area of research (see Gabbay, Shehtman, and
Skvortsov [2009]).
Suppose L is a propositional intermediate logic. It is always possible to con-
sider the corresponding “elementary calculus of free variables,” i.e., the system
obtained by replacing propositional letters with atomic formulas of a first-order
language, with or without identity. For the most part, we will assume identity
is not present, i.e., we consider pure intermediate logics. The following interme-
diate propositional logics will play important roles here:
1. LC, characterized alternatively as the formulas valid on linearly ordered
Kripke frames or as infinite-valued Gdel logic,3 axiomatized over H using
the schema
(A→ B) ∨ (B→ A). (Lin)
2. LCm = LC+Bm, characterized as formulas valid on linearly ordered Kripke
frames of height < m, or as the Go¨del logic on m truth values, also known
as Sm−1 [Hosoi 1966]. Here, Bm is:
(A1 →A2) ∨ (A2 → A3) ∨ · · · ∨ (An → Am+1). (Bm)
3. KC, the logic of weak excluded middle [Jankov 1968], axiomatized over H
using the schema
¬A ∨ ¬¬A. (J)
Definition 3.1. Suppose L is an intermediate logic. A proof π of A from Γ
in the corresponding elementary calculus of free variables is a sequence A1, . . . ,
An of quantifier-free formulas of predicate logic such that each Ai is either a
substitution instance of a formula in L, is in Γ, or follows from formulas Ak and
Al (k, l < i) by modus ponens, and An ≡ A. We then write Γ ⊢piL A. If such a
proof π exists we write Γ ⊢L and if Γ is empty, simply L ⊢ A. If we leave out L,
we mean H.
Intermediate predicate logics contain intuitionistic predicate logicQH and are
closed under substitution, modus ponens, and the usual quantifier rules,
B→A(x)
B→∀y A(y)
A(x)→ B
∃y A(y)→ B
which are subject to the eigenvariable condition: x must not be free in the
conclusion. Some of these are obtained from QH simply by adding propositional
axiom schemes. Equivalently, they can be obtained by expanding a propositional
intermediate logic L to a language with predicates and terms, the standard
quantifier axioms
∀xA(x)→A(t) and
A(t)→∃xA(x)
3See [Dummett 1959]. Note that although there is only one infininite-valued Go¨del logic
considered as a set of tautologies, there are infinitely many different consequence relations on
infinite truth-value sets with the Go¨del truth functions [Baaz and Zach 1998].
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and closing under substitution, modus ponens, and the quantifier rules. This re-
sults in the weakest pure intermediate predicate logic extending L. For instance,
QLC is the weakest first-order logic obtained from LC, and is axiomatized by
QH + Lin. It is complete for linearly-ordered Kripke frames (see Corsi [1992],
Skvortsov [2005]). Not every intermediate predicate logic is obtained in this way,
as it is possible to consistently add additional first-order principles to L. Some
important first-order principles are, e.g., the constant domain principle
∀x(A(x) ∨B)→ (∀xA(x) ∨B), (CD)
the double negation shift (or Kuroda’s principle),
∀x¬¬A(x)→¬¬∀xA(x) (K)
and the quantifier shifts
(B→∃xA(x))→∃x(B→A(x)) (Q∃)
(∀xA(x)→B)→∃x(B→A(x)) (Q∀)
QLC + CD axiomatizes the formulas valid in linearly-ordered Kripke frames
with constant domains, and also the first-order Go¨del logic GR of formulas valid
on the interval [0, 1] [Baaz, Preining, and Zach 2007]. QH+K characterizes the
formulas valid on Kripke frames with the McKinsey property, and so QLC +
CD + K is the logic of linear Kripke frames with maximal element [Skvortsov
2005]. It is also the first-order Go¨del logicG0 of formulas valid on {0}∪ [1/2, 1].
4
QLC+Bm is not complete, contrary to what one might expect, for linear Kripke
frames of height < m. However Gm = QLCm + CD is complete for linearly
ordered Kripke frames of height < m with constant domains. It is also the
m-valued first-order Go¨del logic Gm.
Given any propositional logic L, one can introduce the ε-operator by allowing
for terms of the form εxA(x) for any formula A(x) with x free. One then
introduces all formulas of the form A(t)→ A(εxA(x)) as new axioms. These
formulas are the critical formulas belonging to εxA(x).
In classical logic, it is possible to define the existential quantifier by ∃xA(x) ≡
εxA(x). Since ∃ and ∀ are classically interdefinable, the universal quantifier
can be defined via ∀xA(x) ≡ A(εx ¬A(x)). In intermediate logics other than
classical logic, ∀ and ∃ are not interdefinable. Hence, here it is advisable to treat ∀
separately and introduce a dual version of the ε-operator, traditionally called the
τ -operator. A critical formula belonging to A(τxA(x)) is any formula of the form
A(τx A(x))→A(t). The dual correspondence is given by ∀xA(x) ≡ A(τx A(x)).
We call ε- and τ -terms collectively ετ-terms.
As usual, we consider ε- and τ -terms to be identical up to renaming of bound
variables, and define substitution of ετ -terms into formulas (e.g., A(εxA(x))) so
that bound variables are tacitly renamed so as to avoid clashes.
Definition 3.2. Suppose L is an intermediate propositional logic. An ετ-
proof π of B is a proof in L of formulas in the language including ετ -terms from
4
GR and G0 are the only two axiomatizable first-order Go¨del logics [Baaz, Preining, and
Zach 2007].
THE FIRST EPSILON THEOREM IN INTERMEDIATE LOGICS 7
critical formulas Γ of the form
A(t)→ A(εxA(x))
A(τxA(x))→ A(t).
We write Lετ ⊢ B if such a π exists, or Γ ⊢piLετ B when we want to identify the
critical formulas and the proof π.
We would like to compare intermediate predicate logics QL to the ετ -
calculus Lετ of their propositional fragment L. Since the language of Lετ does
not contain quantifiers, we must define a translation of first-order formulas that
do contain them into the language of the ετ -calculus.
Definition 3.3. The ετ-translation Aετ of a formula A is defined as follows:
Aετ = A if A is atomic
(A ∧B)ετ = Aετ ∧Bετ (A ∨B)ετ = Aετ ∨Bετ
(A→ B)ετ = Aετ → Bετ (¬A)ετ = ¬Aετ
(∃xA(x))ετ = Aετ (εxA(x)
ετ ) (∀xA(x))ετ = Aετ (τxA(x)
ετ )
Again, substitution of ετ -terms for variables must be understood modulo re-
naming of bound variables so as to avoid clashes.
The point of the classical ε-calculus is that it can replace quantifiers and quan-
tifier inferences. And indeed, in classical first-order logic, a first-order formula
A is provable iff its translation Aε is provable in the pure ε-calculus. The “if”
direction is the content of the second ε-theorem, while the “only if” direction
follows more simply by translating derivations.
We defined the ετ -calculus on the basis of a propositional logic L. It is also
possible to define an “extended” ετ -calculus by adding ετ -terms and critical for-
mulas to the full first-order language including quantifiers, and then considering
proofs in QL from critical formulas. Let’s call the calculus so obtained QLετ .
Clearly, if A is quantifier-free and Lετ ⊢ A then QLετ ⊢ A. One may wonder,
however, if QLετ is stronger than Lετ in the sense that for some formulas A,
QLετ ⊢ A but not Lετ ⊢ Aετ . This is not so as long as the ετ -translations of
the quantifier axioms of QL are provable in Lετ ; then the extended ε-calculus
is conservative over the pure ε-calculus.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose QL is a first-order intermediate logic, and for each
quantifier axiom B of QL, Lετ ⊢ Bετ . If QLετ ⊢ A, then Lετ ⊢ Aετ .
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of A. If A is an axiom
in QL, Aετ is either also an axiom in Lετ (if A is not a quantifier axiom) or it
is derivable in Lετ (if A is a quantifier axiom, by hypothesis).
If B → A(x) is derivable and x is not free in B, then so is B → A(τx A(x)),
by substituting τxA(x) everywhere x appears free in the derivation, and renam-
ing bound variables to avoid clashes. Similarly, if B(x)→ A is derivable, so is
B(εxB(x))→ A. ⊣
The examples of intermediate predicate logics we consider satisfy the condition
of the theorem. The standard quantifier axioms translate directly into critical
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formulas:
[A(t)→∃xA(x)]ετ = Aετ (t)→Aετ (εxA
ετ (x))
[∀xA(x)→A(t)]ετ = Aετ (τxA
ετ (x))→Aετ (t)
As we’ll see in Section 4, the quantifier axioms of several other intermediate
predicate logics also satisfy the condition that their ετ -translations are derivable
from critical formulas alone.
Corollary 3.5. If QL satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.4, and A contains
no quantifiers, then QLετ ⊢ A iff Lετ ⊢ A.
Proof. If A contains no quantifiers, then Aετ ≡ A. ⊣
Proposition 3.6. For any intermediate predicate logic QL,
QLετ ⊢ ∀xA(x)↔ A(τxA(x)) and
QLετ ⊢ ∃xA(x)↔ A(εxA(x)).
Proof. In each case, one direction is an instance of the corresponding quan-
tifier axiom, and the other direction follows from a critical formula by the corre-
sponding quantifier rule. For instance, A(εxA(x))→∃xA is an axiom in QLετ ,
and from the critical formula A(x)→ A(εxA(x)) we get ∃xA→ A(εxA(x)) by
the ∃-rule, since x is not free in A(εxA(x)). ⊣
Proposition 3.7. If QL satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.4, then QLετ ⊢
A↔ Aετ .
Proof. SinceQL includesQH, the substitution ruleB↔C ⊢ D(B)↔D(C) is
admissible. The result follows by induction on complexity of A and the previous
proposition. ⊣
§4. Critical Formulas and Quantifier Shifts. We will show later (Theo-
rem 5.3) that any ετ -calculus for an intermediate logic L is conservative over L.
It is well-known that ετ -calculus over intuitionistic logic is not conservative over
intuitionistic predicate logic. Classical ε-calculus, however, is conservative over
classical logic. That is the content of the second ε-theorem, which says that for
any formula A not containing ε-terms but possibly containing quantifiers, if Aετ
is provable in the classical ε-calculus, then A is already provable in the predicate
calculus. We’ll show now that for any intermediate logic L, the ετ -translations of
all classically valid quantifier shift principles are provable from critical formulas.
Quantifier shift formulas divide into two kinds. On the one hand, we have those
conditionals that yield an outside existential quantifier or an inside universal
quantifier in the consequent of the conditional. Their ετ -translations are critical
formulas, and hence provable in Lετ (see Table 4).
The other formulas are provable from critical formulas together with some
propositional principles, all of which are intuitionistically provable and hence
provable in all intermediate logics. For instance, to obtain the ετ -translation of
(∀xA(x) ∨B)→∀x(A(x) ∨B),
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C(x) t1 t2
∀x(A(x) ∨B)→ (∀xA(x) ∨B) A(x) ∨B τxC(x) τxA(x) (CD)
(∃xA(x) ∨B)→∃x(A(x) ∨B) A(x) ∨B εxA(x) εx C(x)
∀x(A(x) ∧B)→ (∀xA(x) ∧B) A(x) ∧B τxC(x) τxA(x)
(∃xA(x) ∧B)→∃x(A(x) ∧B) A(x) ∧B εxA(x) εx C(x)
(B→∃xA(x))→∃x(B→A(x)) B→ A(x) εxA(x) εx C(x) (Q∃)
∀x(B→ A(x))→ (B→∀xA(x)) B→ A(x) τxC(x) τxA(x)
(∀xA(x)→B)→∃x(A(x)→B) A(x)→ B τxA(x) εx C(x) (Q∀)
∀x(A(x)→B)→ (∃xA(x)→B) A(x)→ B τxC(x) εxA(x)
∀x¬¬A(x)→¬¬∀xA(x) ¬¬A(x) τx ¬¬A(x) τxA(x) (K)
Table 1. Quantifier shift formulas whose ετ -translations are
critical formulas. In each case, x is not free in B, and the ετ -
translation of the quantifier shift formula on the left is C(t1)→
C(t2).
take A1 = A(τxA(x)) and A2 = A(τx (A(x) ∨ B)). Then A1 → A2 is a critical
formula, viz.,
A(τx A(x))→A(τx (A(x) ∨B)).
Apply modus ponens to it and the principle
(A1 → A2)→ ((A1 ∨B)→ (A2 ∨B)).
This same pattern works in all cases, the required critical formulas A1→A2 and
propositional principles are given in Table 4.
The most interesting quantifier shift formulas here are CD , Q∀, and Q∃, since
they are not intuitionistically valid. By contrast, we have:
Proposition 4.1. (1) (CD)ετ , (Q∃)
ετ , and (Q∀)
ετ are provable in Lετ .
(2) (CD), (Q∃), and (Q∀) are provable in QLετ .
Proof. (1) They are critical formulas; see Table 4.
(2) Follows from Proposition 3.7. ⊣
Note that the only intuitionistically invalid De Morgan rule for quantifiers,
¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x), (Q)
is a special case of (Q∀), taking ⊥ for B; (Q)
ετ is a critical formula. The ετ -
translation of double negation shift Kετ is
¬¬A(τx ¬¬A(x))→¬¬A(τx A(x))
and is also a critical formula.
In classical first-order logic, both the addition of ε-operators and critical for-
mulas and the replacement of quantifiers by ε-operators is conservative. The pre-
vious results show that for extensions of first-order intuitionistic logic, this is not
the case: intuitionistically invalid quantified formulas (or their ετ -translations)
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(∀xA(x) ∨B)→∀x(A(x) ∨B) A1 = A(τxA(x)), A2 = A(τx (A ∨B))
∃x(A(x) ∨B)→ (∃xA(x) ∨B) A1 = A(εx (A(x) ∨B)), A2 = A(εxA(x))
(A1 ∨B)→ (A2 ∨B) (A1 → A2)→ ((A1 ∨B)→ (A2 ∨B))
∀x(A(x) ∧B)→ (∀xA(x) ∧B) A1 = A(τxA(x)), A2 = A(τx (A(x) ∧B))
∃x(A(x) ∧B)→ (∃xA(x) ∧B) A1 = A(εx (A(x) ∧B)), A2 = A(εxA(x))
(A1 ∧B)→ (A2 ∧B) (A1 → A2)→ ((A1 ∧B)→ (A2 ∧B))
∃x(B→A(x))→ (B→∃xA(x)) A1 = A(εx (B→A(x))), A2 = A(εxA(x))
(B→∀xA(x))→∀x(B→A(x)) A1 = A(τxA(x)), A2 = A(τx (B→ A(x)))
(B→ A1)→ (B→ A2) (A1 →A2)→ ((B→ A1)→ (B→ A2))
∃x(A(x)→B)→ (∀xA(x)→B) A1 = A(τx A(x)), A2 = A(εx (A(x)→B))
(∃xA(x)→B)→∀x(A(x)→ B) A1 = A(τx (A(x)→B)), A2 = A(εxA(x))
(A1 →B)→ (A2 →B) (A1 →A2)→ ((A2 →B)→ (A1 →B))
Table 2. Proofs of ετ -translations of quantifier shift formulas.
In each case, x is not free in B, A1→A2 is a critical formula, the
ετ -translation of the formula is given on the left. The propo-
sitional principle on the right is provable in intuitionistic logic,
and the ετ -translation of the quantifier shift formula follows by
one application of modus ponens.
become provable. However, these quantifier shifts are provable in some interme-
diate logics, e.g., in some Go¨del logics.
We might think of ετ -terms semantically as terms for objects which serve the
role of generics taking on the role of quantifiers, and indeed in classical logic this
connection is very close. Because of the validity of
∃x(∃y A(y)→ A(x)) (Wel1)
∃x(A(x)→∀y A(y)) (Wel2)
in classical logic, there always is an object x which behaves as an ε-term (A(x)
holds iff ∃xA(x) holds), and an object x which behaves as a τ -term (i.e., A(x)
holds iff ∀y A(y) holds). One might expect then that Wel1 and Wel2, when
added to QH, have the same effect as adding critical formulas, i.e., that all
quantifier shifts become provable. Note thatWel1 andWel2 are intuitionistically
equivalent to
∃x∀y(A(y)→A(x)) (Wel ′1)
∃x∀y(A(x)→A(y)). (Wel ′2)
As is easily checked, QH ⊢ Wel1 ↔ Q∃ and QH ⊢ Wel2 ↔ Q∀, and even
QH ⊢Wel2 → CD . However, QH+Wel1 0 CD .5
§5. Lετ is Conservative over L. It is a consequence of the first ε-theorem
that ε-free formulas provable in the pure ε-calculus are already provable in the
5See p. 694 of Skvortsov [2006].
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elementary calculus of free variables. In particular, the ε-calculus is conserva-
tive over propositional logic. Work by Bell [1993] and DeVidi [1995] shows that,
however, the addition of critical formulas to intuitionistic logic results in inu-
itionistically invalid propositional formulas becoming provable in certain simple
theories. These results require the presence of identity axioms. One may won-
der if these results can be strengthened to the pure logic and the ετ -calculus
alone. The following proposition shows that this is not the case. The addition
of critical formulas to intermediate logics alone does not have any effects on the
propositional level.
Definition 5.1. The shadow As of a formula is defined as follows:
P (t1, . . . , tn)
s = XP
(t1 = t2)
s = ⊤
(A ∧B)s = As ∧Bs (A ∨B)s = As ∨Bs
(A→B)s = As→ Bs (¬A)s = ¬As
(∃xA(x))s = A(x)s (∀xA(x))s = A(x)s
where XP is a propositional variable and ⊤ is any theorem of L.
The shadow of a proof π = A1, . . . , An is A
s
1, . . . , A
s
n.
A first-order extensionQL of an intermediate logicL is preserved under shadow
if
1. L ⊢ As for all quantifier axioms A of QL, and
2. if A1, . . . , An ⊢QL B is a rule of inference of QL then As1, . . . , A
s
n ⊢L B
s.
A first-order intermediate logic QL is preserved under shadow essentially if
all its quantifier axioms and rules remain provable if the first-order structure
and the quantifiers are removed. In particular, for the two standard quantifier
axioms we have (∀xA→ A(t)s ≡ (A(t)→∃xA(x))s ≡ A(x)s → A(x)s, which is
intuitionistically valid. (Clearly, A(t)s ≡ A(x)s.) For the quantifier rules, the
shadows of premise and conclusion are identical, e.g.,
(B→A(x))s ≡ Bs→ A(x)s ≡ (B→∀xA(x))s
The shadows of identity axioms are: (t = t)s ≡ ⊤ and
(t1 = t2 → (A(t1)→A(t2)))
s ≡ ⊤→ (A(t1)
s→A(t1)
s)
since A(t1)
s = A(t2)
s. Both are provable in H with identity.
All intermediate first-order logics mentioned above are preserved under
shadow. They are axiomatized by various quantifier shift principles. As we have
seen in the preceding section, the ετ -translations of all such quantifier shift prin-
ciples become provable in the corresponding ετ -calculus. However, the shadow
of such a quantifier shift principle is a formula of the form B→B.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose QL extends L and is preserved under shadow. If
A1, . . . , An ⊢QLετ B, then As1, . . . , A
s
n ⊢L B
s. This also holds if identity axioms
are present.
Proof. The shadows of critical formulas and identity axioms are provable
in H. ⊣
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As a consequence, we have the following conservativity result for all interme-
diate ετ -calculi:
Theorem 5.3. If QL extends L and is preserved under shadow, then QLετ
is conservative over L for propositional formulas. In particular, no new propo-
sitional formulas become provable by the addition of critical formulas in any
intermediate logic, including intuitionistic logic itself.
§6. The First ετ-Theorem Fails unless L ⊢ Bm. In classical first-order
logic, the main result about the ε-calculus is the first ε-theorem. It states that if
A(e1, . . . , en), where the ei are ε-terms, is provable in the pure ε-calculus, then
there are ε-free terms tji such that
A(t1i , . . . , t
1
n) ∨ · · · ∨ A(t
m
i , . . . , t
m
n )
is provable in classical propositional logic alone. Such ε-terms ei appear as the
result of translating ∃x1 . . . ∃xn A(x1, . . . , xn) into the ε-calculus.
In the context of intermediate logics, we may formulate the statement as fol-
lows:
Definition 6.1. An intermediate logic L has the first ετ -theorem, if, when-
ever Lετ ⊢ A(e1, . . . , en) for some ε- or τ -terms e1, . . . , en, then there are ετ -free
terms tji such that
L ⊢ A(t1i , . . . , t
1
n) ∨ · · · ∨A(t
m
i , . . . , t
m
n ).
We obtain a first negative result: if Lετ has the first epsilon theorem, then an
instance of Bm, i.e.,
(A1 → A2) ∨ . . . ∨ (Am →Am+1)
for some m ≥ 2 is provable already in the propositional fragment L.6 This rules
out a first ετ -theorem for, e.g., ετ -calculi for intuitionistic logic and infinite-
valued Go¨del logic.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose Lετ has the first ετ-theorem. Then L ⊢ Bm for
some m ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider Let A(z) ≡ (P (f(z)) → P (z)) and ∃z A(z), i.e.,
∃z(P (f(z))→P (z)). (Note that this is the Herbrand form of ∃z∀u(P (u)→P (z)).
Let e ≡ εz (P (f(z))→P (z)). The ετ -translation of ∃z A(z) is is P (f(e))→P (e),
i.e.,
V ≡ P (f(εz (P (f(z))→ P (z))))→ P (εz (P (f(z))→ P (z)))
Let U ≡ A(εx P (x)) ≡ P (f(εx P (x)))→ P (εx P (x)). Note that U is of the form
P (t)→ P (εx P (x)), so it is a critical formula. Also note that U → V is of the
form A(t)→A(e), and so U → V is also a critical formula.
Since L ⊢ (U→V )→(U→V ), and U→V and U are critical formulas, Lετ ⊢ V .
By assumption, Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, so L proves a disjunction of the
form
(P (f(t1))→ P (t1)) ∨ · · · ∨ (P (f(tn))→ P (tn))
6For m = 2, this schema is equivalent to A ∨ ¬A: take ⊤ for A1, A for A2, ⊥ for A3.
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for some terms t1, . . . , tn. (This is a Herbrand disjunction of ∃z A(z).) Each
term ti is of the form f
j(s) for some j ≥ 0 and a term s which does not start
with f . By rearranging the disjuncts to group disjuncts with the same innermost
term s together (using commutativity of ∨) and by adding additional disjuncts
as needed (using weakening), from this we obtain a formula
(P (f(s1))→ P (s1))∨ · · · ∨ (P (f
j1+1(s1))→ P (f
j1(s1))) ∨
...
(P (sl)→ P (f(sl)))∨ · · · ∨ (P (f
jl+1(sl))→ P (f
jl(sl))) ∨
Replace P (f i(sj)) by Ai in the proof of the last formula and contract identical
disjuncts. This yields a proof of (A1→A2)∨ · · · ∨ (Am→Am+1) where m is the
largest among j1, . . . , jl. ⊣
A formula of the form Bm is provable in L iff L is a finite-valued Go¨del logic
LCn (Proposition 6.5). By contrast, no Bm is provable in intuitionistic logic H,
Jankov logic KC, or in infinite-valued Go¨del logic LC (Proposition 6.3).
Proposition 6.3. 1. LCm ⊢ Bm
2. L 6⊢ Bm for L any of LCm with k > m, LC, KC, H.
Proof. (1) Follows by definition, since LCm = LC+Bm.
(2) Let v(Ai) = 1/i if i < m and v(An+1) = 0. This is a valuation in a Go¨del
truth value set with k elements if k > m and also in the infinite truth value set
[0, 1]. Then for all i ≤ m, v(Ai) > v(Ai+1) and hence v(Bm) < 1. ⊣
Proposition 6.4. H+Bm ⊢ Lin
Proof. Simultaneously substitute A for Ai if i is odd, and B for Ai if i is
even in Bm. The result is one of
(A→ B) ∨ (B→ A) ∨ · · · ∨ (A→B)
(A→ B) ∨ (B→ A) ∨ · · · ∨ (B→A)
Both are equivalent in H to (A→B) ∨ (B→A). ⊣
Proposition 6.5. If L ⊢ Bn, then L = LCm for some m.
Proof. Hosoi [1966] showed that the n-valued Go¨del logic is axiomatized by
H+Rn−1, where Rn is
A1 ∨ (A1 → A2) ∨ · · · ∨ (An−1 → An) ∨ ¬An.
By simultaneously substituting ⊤ for A1, and⊥ for An+1, and Ai−1 for Ai (i = 2,
. . . , n) in Bn, we obtain
(⊤→ A1) ∨ (A1 → A2) ∨ · · · ∨ (An−2 →An−1) ∨ (An−1 →⊥),
which is equivalent to Rn−1 in H. Hence, since L ⊢ Bn, LCn ⊆ L.
Furthermore, Hosoi [1967, Lemma 4.1] showed that if L ⊢ Lin then L = LCm
for some m or L = LC. Since L ⊢ Bn, L ⊢ Lin by Proposition 6.4. The result
follows as LC 0 Bn and so L 6= LC.7 ⊣
7In Hosoi’s nomenclature, LCn is Sn−1 and LC is Sω .
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Corollary 6.6. Intuitionistic logic H, Jankov logic KC, and infinite-valued
Go¨del logic LC do not have the first ετ-theorem.
We have restricted L here to be an intermediate logic. However, it bears
remarking that Theorem 6.2 does not require that L contains H. An inspection
of the proof shows that all that is required is that L ⊢ A → A, and in L,
∨ is provably commutative, associative, and idempotent, and has weakening
(L ⊢ A→ (A ∨ B)). Thus, Corollary 6.6 applies to any ετ -calculus based on a
logic which has these properties (such as, say,  Lukasiewicz logic.)
The first ε-theorem in classical logic shows that if an existential for-
mula ∃xA(x) is provable, so is a disjunction of instances
∨
iA(ti). Clearly this
is equivalent to: if ∀xA(x) → B is provable so is
∧
A(ti)→ B. Without the
interdefinability of ∀ and ∃, the question arises whether the alternative form of
the ε-theorem might hold in an intermediate ετ -calculus even if the standard
form does not. We’ll show that the versions are, in fact, equivalent even in
intermediate logics.
Proposition 6.7. The following are equivalent:
1. If Lετ ⊢ A(e) then L ⊢
∨
iA(t).
2. If B(e′) ⊢Lετ C then
∧
j B(sj) ⊢L C for C ετ-free.
3. If B(e′) ⊢Lετ C(e) then
∧
j B(sj) ⊢L
∨
iC(ti).
Proof. (1) implies (3): Suppose
B(e′) ⊢Lετ C(e).
By the deduction theorem,
⊢Lετ B(e
′)→ C(e).
By (1) we have terms si, ti so that
⊢
∨
i
(B(si)→ C(ti))
By intuitionistic logic,
⊢
∧
i
B(si)→
∨
i
C(ti) and so
∧
i
B(si) ⊢
∨
i
C(ti)
by the deduction theorem.
(3) clearly implies (1) and (2).
(2) implies (1): Let X be a propositional variable. A ⊢H (A→X)→X . So if
Lετ ⊢ A(e) then by the deduction theorem,
A(e)→X ⊢Lετ X and by (2),
∧
i
(A(si)→X) ⊢L X.
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Now substitute
∨
iA(si) for X :
∧
i
(A(si)→
∨
i
A(si)) ⊢L
∨
i
A(si).
The formula on the left is provable intuitionistically. ⊣
§7. Elimination Sets and Excluded Middle. The basic idea of Hilbert’s
proof of the first ε-theorem is this: Suppose we have a proof of E ≡ D(e) from
critical formulas Γ,Λ(e), where e is a critical ε-term and Λ(e) is a set of critical
formulas belonging to e. Now we find terms t1, . . . , tk such that replacing
e by ti allows us to remove the critical formulas Λ(e), while at the same time
replacing the end-formulaD(e) by
∨k
i=1D(ti) and the remaining critical formulas
by Γ[t1/e], . . . , Γ[tk/e]. We repeat this procedure in such a way that eventually
all critical formulas are removed and we are left with a disjunction of instances
of E, as required by the first ε-theorem. The difficulty of making this work
lies in three challenges. The first is a suitable way of selecting ε-terms e and
corresponding critical formulas Λ(e) so that the Λ(e) can be removed. The
second is to ensure that in passing from Γ to Γ[ti/e] we again obtain critical
formulas. (Replacing an ε-term in a critical formula by another term does in
general not result in a critical formula. E.g., let A(y) ≡ B(εx C(x, y), y) and
e ≡ εxC(x, t) then A(t)[s/e] is B(s, t) but A(εyA(y))[s/e] is just A(εyA(y)).
The third challenge is to guarantee that the process eventually terminates with
no critical formulas remaining.
We begin by focussing on the first challenge.
Definition 7.1. Suppose Γ ⊢piLετ D with critical formulas Γ, and e is an ε-
term εxA(x) (τ -term τxA(x)). If C ≡ A(t)→A(εxA(x)) ∈ Γ (C ≡ A(τxA(x))→
A(t) ∈ Γ) we say e is the critical ετ-term of C, that e belongs to C, and that e
is a critical ετ-term of π.
Definition 7.2. Suppose Γ,Λ(e),Λ′(e) ⊢piLετ D(e) where Λ(e) ∪ Λ(e)
′ are all
critical formulas belonging to e. A set of terms s1, . . . , sk is an e-elimination
set for π and Λ(e) if
Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e],Λ
′(e) ⊢L D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨D(sk).
If Λ(e) is the set of all critical formulas belonging to e (i.e., Λ′(e) = ∅) then an
e-elimination set for Λ(e) is called a complete e-elimination set.
Here, Γ[si/e] means the result of replacing, in each formula in Γ, every occur-
rence of e by si. If T = {s1, . . . , sk} we write Γ[T ] for Γ[s1], . . . , Γ[sk]. Note
that we do not require in the definition of e-elimination sets that the formulas
in Γ[si/e] are actually critical formulas.
Lemma 7.3. If C ≡ A(t)→ A(e) or C ≡ A(e)→ A(t) is a critical formula
with critical ετ-term e, then C[s/e] is A(t[s/e])→ A(s) or A(s) → A(t[s/e]),
respectively.
Proof. Since e is the critical ε-term of C, e ≡ εxA(x) or e ≡ τxA(x).
Hence, e cannot occur in A(x), since otherwise it would be a proper subbterm
of itself. ⊣
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Lemma 7.4. If Γ ⊢L D then Γ[t/e] ⊢L D[t/e]
Proof. Any proof of D from Γ using modus ponens and axioms of L remains
correct if terms in it are uniformly replaced by other terms. ⊣
Lemma 7.5. In any intermediate logic L:
1. If Γ, A ⊢ C and Γ′, B ⊢L D then Γ,Γ′, A ∨B ⊢ C ∨D.
2. If Γ, A ⊢L C and B ⊢ A, then Γ, B ⊢ C.
Proposition 7.6. In Cετ , every critical formula C(e) has an e-elimination
set.
Proof. Suppose first that e is an ε-term; then C(e) is A(s)→A(e). Let Λ′(e)
be the critical formulas belonging to e other than C(e), and Γ the remaining
critical formulas for which e is not critical. So we have:
Γ,Λ′(e), A(s)→ A(e) ⊢C D(e)
On the one hand, by replacing e everywhere by s we get
Γ[s/e],Λ′(s), A(s[s/e])→ A(s) ⊢C D(s)
and by Lemma 7.5(2), since A(s) ⊢ A(s[s/e])→A(s) ∈ Λ′(e) and A(s) ⊢ C(s),
Γ[s/e], A(s) ⊢C D(s)
On the other hand, since ¬A(s) ⊢ A(s)→A(e),
Γ,¬A(s) ⊢C D(e) and so,
Γ,Γ[s/e], A(s) ∨ ¬A(s) ⊢C D(e) ∨D(s).
by Lemma 7.5(1). Since C ⊢ A(s) ∨ ¬A(s) we have
Γ,Γ[s/e] ⊢C D(e) ∨D(s)
Thus, {e, s} is an e-elimination set for the critical formula C(e).
Similarly, if e is a τ -term and C(e) is A(e)→A(s) we get
Γ[s/e],Λ′(s), C(s) ⊢C D(s)
and by Lemma 7.5(2), since ¬A(s) ⊢ C′ ∈ Λ′(e) and ¬A(s) ⊢ C(s),
Γ[s/e],¬A(s) ⊢C D(s)
On the other hand, A(s) ⊢ C(e), so
Γ, A(s) ⊢C D(e) andΓ,Γ[s/e],¬A(s) ∨ A(s) ⊢C D(e) ∨D(s).
by Lemma 7.5(1). ⊣
This shows that in classical logic, every single critical formula can be elimi-
nated from the proof. More generally, the set of all critical formulas belonging
to e has a (complete) e-elimination set in C:
Proposition 7.7. In Cετ , every critical ετ-term has a complete e-
elimination set.
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Proof. Let C1 ≡ A(s1) → A(e), . . . , Ck ≡ A(sk) → A(e) be the critical
formulas belonging to e if e is an ε-term. Since
Γ, C1(e), . . . , Ck(e) ⊢C D(e), also
Γ[si/e], C1(si), . . . , Ck(si) ⊢C D(si)
(writing Cj(si) for Cj [si/e]). Since A(si) ⊢ A(sj(si))→A(si) ≡ Cj(si),
Γ[si/e], A(si) ⊢C D(si)
by Lemma 7.5(2). By applying Lemma 7.5(1),
Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e], A(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ A(sk) ⊢C D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨D(sk).
On the other hand, since ¬A(si) ⊢ A(si)→A(e), we get ¬A(s1) ∧ . . . ∧ A(sk) ⊢
Cj(e) for each j = 1, . . . , k, so we also have, from the first line by Lemma 7.5(2),
Γ,¬A(s1) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬A(sk) ⊢C D(e).
Since
∨
iA(si) ∨ (
∧
i ¬A(si)) is an instance of excluded middle, we have
Γ,Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e] ⊢C D(e) ∨D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨D(sk).
If e is a τ -term, then the critical formulas are of the form Cj(e) ≡ A(e)→
A(sj(e)) and consequently Cj(si) is A(si)→A(sj(si)). Each is implied by ¬A(si),
so we have
Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk, e],¬A(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬A(sk) ⊢C D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨D(sk)
On the other hand, A(s1) ∧ · · · ∧ A(sk) ⊢ A(e)→ A(sj), so
Γ, A(s1) ∧ · · · ∧ A(sk) ⊢C D(e)
and consequently
Γ,Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e] ⊢C D(e) ∨D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨D(sk),
since
∧
iA(si) ∨
∨
i ¬A(si) is a tautology.
In each case, e, s1, . . . , sk is an e-elimination set. ⊣
Remark 7.8. Of course, the fact that in C we have complete e-
elimination sets can also be obtained by applying Proposition 7.6 k-
many times. Applying it to C1(e) results in T1 = {e, s1(e)}, ap-
plying it to C2(e) in T2 = {e, s1(e), s2(e), s1(s2(e))}, to C3 in T3 =
{e, s1(e), s2(e), s1(s2(e)), s3(e), s1(s3(e)), s2(s3(e)), s1(s2(s3(e)))}, etc., i.e., the
resulting disjunction has 2k+1 disjuncts, whereas the disjunction resulting from
Proposition 7.7 only has k + 1 disjuncts. However, see Remark 9.12.
We know that intermediate logics other than LCm do not have the first ετ -
theorem and so not every ετ -term will have complete e-elimination sets. How-
ever, if the starting formula E is of a special form, they sometimes do. In the
proof for the classical case above, this required excluded middle. But it need
not. For instance, if E is negated, then weak excluded middle (¬A ∨ ¬¬A) is
enough.
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Proposition 7.9. If L ⊢ J , then every ετ-term in an Lετ -proof of ¬D has a
complete e-elimination set.
Proof. Let C1 ≡ A(s1) → A(e), . . . , Ck ≡ A(sk) → A(e) be the critical
formulas belonging to e if e is an ε-term. As before, we have
Γ[si/e], A(si) ⊢L ¬D(si)
Intuitionistically, B→¬C ⊢ ¬¬B→¬C, so
Γ[si/e],¬¬A(si) ⊢L ¬D(si)
We obtain
Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e],
¬¬A(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬A(sk) ⊢L ¬D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬D(sk)
Again as before, we have
Γ,¬A(s1) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬A(sk) ⊢L ¬D(e).
and together
Γ[s1/e], . . . ,Γ[sk/e],Γ,
(¬A(s1) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬A(sk)) ∨
¬¬A(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬A(sk) ⊢L ¬D(e) ∨ ¬D(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬D(sk)
Since
(¬A(s1) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬A(sk)) ∨ ¬¬A(s1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬A(sk)
is provable from weak excluded middle, the claim is proved. ⊣
§8. Elimination Sets using Bm and Lin. We’ve showed in Theorem 6.2
that the provability Bm for some m ≥ 2 is a necessary condition for an inter-
mediate logic to have the first ετ -theorem. In this section, we show that it is
also sufficient: if L ⊢ Bm for some m, then every critical ετ -term has a complete
e-elimination set.
In preparation for the proof we consider an example to illustrate the basic
idea. Suppose LC3ετ ⊢ D(e) with the set of critical formulas
Cs(e) ≡ A(s(e))→A(e)
Ct(e) ≡ A(t(e))→A(e)
Cu(e) ≡ A(u)→A(e)
Cv(e) ≡ A(v)→A(e)
where terms u and v do not contain e. Let C(e) be the conjunction of these
critical formulas. We have Cs(e), Ct(e), Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e).
We’ll consider sets of terms Xi where X0 = {e} and Xi+1 = {s(x), t(x) : x ∈
Xi}. For the sake of readability we will leave out parentheses then writing these
terms, e.g., s(t(e)) is abbreviated as ste.
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For every w ∈ X1 we have C(w) ⊢ D(w). So, by applying Lemma 7.5(1) twice,
we get:
C(se) ∨ Cs(e),
C(te) ∨ Ct(e),
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e) ∨D(se) ∨D(te)
By distributivity, C(se) ∨ Cs(e) is equivalent to
(Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e)) ∧ (Ct(se) ∨Cs(e)) ∧
(Cu(se) ∨ Cs(e)) ∧ (Cv(se) ∨ Cs(e))
Thus we get
Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e), Ct(se) ∨ Cs(e),
Cu(se) ∨ Cs(e), Cv(se) ∨ Cs(e),
C(te) ∨ Ct(e),
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e) ∨D(se) ∨D(te)
We have
Cu(e) ≡ A(u)→ A(e) ⊢LC3 (A(u)→A(se)) ∨ (A(se)→ A(e)) ≡ Cu(se) ∨Cs(e)
using Lin. Similarly, Cv(e) ⊢LC3 Cv(se) ∨ Cs(e), so we have by Lemma 7.5(2):
Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e), Ct(se) ∨ Cs(e),
C(te) ∨ Ct(e),
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e) ∨D(se) ∨D(te)
Repeating this consideration with C(te) ∨ Ct(e) yields
Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e), Ct(se) ∨ Cs(e),
Cs(te) ∨ Ct(e), Ct(te) ∨ Ct(e),
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e) ∨D(se) ∨D(te)
Note that each of the four resulting disjunctions has as first disjunct a sub-
stitution instance of a critical formula of the form Cs(w) or Ct(w) where
w ∈ X1. X2 are the terms of the form s(w) and t(w). So we can repeat
the process, pairing C(s(w)) with Cs(w) and C(t(w)) with Ct(w), i.e., obtaining
C(sse) ∨ Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e), C(tse) ∨ Ct(se) ∨ Cs(e), etc. In each case, after dis-
tributing and removing conjuncts of the form Cu(w) ∨ . . . we are left with now
eight disjunctions:
Cs(sse) ∨Cs(se) ∨ Cs(e),
Ct(sse) ∨ Cs(se) ∨Cs(e),
...
Ct(tte) ∨ Ct(te) ∨ Ct(e),
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D(e) ∨D(se) ∨D(te) ∨D(sse) ∨ · · · ∨D(tte)
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It remains to show that the formulas on the right of the turnstile are provable
in LC3. First, consider a formula of the form Ci(w) ∨ · · · ∨ Cj(e), e.g.,
Cs(tse) ∨ Ct(se) ∨ Cs(e), i.e.,
(A(stse))→A(tse)) ∨ (A(tse)→A(se)) ∨ (A(se)→ A(e))
In each disjunct, the consequent equals the antecedent of the disjunct immedi-
ately to the right, i.e., it is a substitution instance of
(A1 →A2) ∨ (A2 →A3) ∨ (A3 → A4)
i.e., of B3. Since LC3 ⊢ B3, these are all provable.
If we take D′(e) to be the disjunction obtained on the right, we have
Cu(e), Cv(e) ⊢LC3 D
′(e) and thus also
Cu(u), Cv(u) ⊢LC3 D
′(u) and
Cu(v), Cv(u) ⊢LC3 D
′(v).
As Cu(u) and Cv(v) are of the form A→ A this reduces to
Cu(v) ⊢LC3 D
′(u) and
Cv(u) ⊢LC3 D
′(v) and therefore:
Cu(v) ∨ Cv(u) ⊢LC3 D
′(u) ∨D′(v).
But Cu(v) ∨ Cv(u) is an instance of Lin .
Lemma 8.1. If L ⊢ Lin, then for all m,
A1 →Am+1 ⊢L (A1 → A2) ∨ · · · ∨ (Am →Am+1).
Proof. By induction on m. If m = 1, this amounts to the claim: A1→A2 ⊢L
A1 → A2, which is trivial. Now suppose the claim holds for m. Then
A1 → Am+2 ⊢L (A1 → Am+1) ∨ (Am+1 →Am+2)
from the instance (A1→Am+1)∨ (Am+1→A1) of Lin. By induction hypothesis,
A1 → Am+1 ⊢L (A1 → A2) ∨ · · · ∨ (Am →Am+1)
and the claim follows by H. ⊣
Definition 8.2. A critical formula A(t)→ A(e) (or A(e)→ A(t) is e is a τ -
term) is called predicative if e does not occur in t, and impredicative otherwise.
Lemma 8.3. If L ⊢ Bm, and ∆(e) are the predicative critical formulas belong-
ing to the ετ-term e. Then ∆(e) has an e-elimination set.
Proof. Suppose Γ,∆(e),Π(e) ⊢L D(e), where Π(e) is the set of predicative
critical formulas belonging to e.
Suppose Π(e) and ∆(e) consist of, respectively, the critical formulas
Cui(e) ≡ A(ui)→ A(e)
Csi(e) ≡ A(si(e))→A(e).
The proof generalizes the preceding example: we successively substitute terms
for e in such a way that a disjunction of instances of D is implied by substitution
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instances of the critical formulas in Γ together with a disjunction of the form Bm
plus the predicative critical formulas Π(e). Once k = m, the disjunction becomes
provable from Bm.
Let T0 = {e} and Ti+1 = {sj(t) : t ∈ Ti, j ≤ r}. Let Γ(T ) = {C[t/e] : C ∈
Γ, t ∈ T }. If w is a word over {s1, . . . , sr}, i.e., w = si1 . . . sik then we write
wj(t) for sij (sij+1 (. . . sik(t) . . . )). So e.g., if w = sst then w1(e) is s(s(t(e))),
w3(e) = t(e) and w4(e) = e. Let W (m) be the set of all length m words over s1,
. . . , sr.
We show by induction on m that
Γ,Γ(T1), . . . ,Γ(Tm−1),Λm,Π(e) ⊢L
m∨
i=1
∨
t∈Ti−1
D(t)
where
Λi = {
m∨
i=1
C(w, i) : w ∈ W (m)} and
C(w, i) ≡ A(wi(e))→A(wi+1(e)).
The induction basis is m = 1. Then
T1 = {s1(e), . . . , sr(e)},
W (1) = {s1, . . . , sr},
C(sj , 1) ≡ A(sj(e))→A(e)
and so each disjunction in Λi is just one of the impredicative critical formulas
A(sj(e))→ A(e)), i.e., Λ1 = ∆(e). Likewise, the disjunction on the right is just
D(e). So the claim holds by the assumption that Γ,∆(e),Π(e) ⊢ D(e).
Now let v = si1 . . . sim be a length m word, and
Λm(v) = {
m∨
i=1
(A(wi(e))→A(wi+1(e)) : w ∈ W (m) \ {v}}
C(v) ≡
m∨
i=1
(A(vi(e))→ A(vi+1(e))
In other words, Λm = Λm(v) ∪ {C(v)}. We’ll abbreviate Γ(T1), . . . ,Γ(Tm−1) as
Γ′ and
∨m
i=1
∨
t∈Ti−1
D(t) as D′. The induction hypothesis can then be written
as:
Γ,Γ′, C(v),Λm(v),Π(e) ⊢L D
′
Take t = v1(e) i.e., si1(. . . sim(e)). By replacing e by t in π, we have
Γ(t),Λ(t),Π(t) ⊢L D(t) and so also
Γ(t),
∧
Λ(t) ∧
∧
Π(t) ⊢L D(t)
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Combining this with the induction hypothesis using Lemma 7.5(1) we have
Γ,Γ′,Γ(t),
(
∧
Λ(t) ∧
∧
Π(t)) ∨ C(v),
Λm(v),Π(e) ⊢L D
′ ∨D(t)
If we write Ξ ∨G for {F ∨G : F ∈ Ξ}, by distributivity,
Γ,Γ′,Γ(t),
Λ(t) ∨ C(v),
Π(t) ∨ C(v),
Λm(v),Π(e) ⊢L D
′ ∨D(t)
Recall that t ≡ v1(e) where v is a word of length m. The formulas in Π(t) are of
the form A(ui)→ A(v1(e)), so a formula in Π(t) ∨ C(v) is of the form
(A(ui)→A(v1(e))) ∨ (A(v1(e))→A(v2(e))) ∨ · · · ∨ (A(vm(e))→A(e)).
Each such formula is implied by A(ui)→ A(e) by Lemma 8.1, which is in Π(e).
So we get
Γ,Γ′,Γ(t),Λ(t) ∨ C(v),Λm(v),Π(e) ⊢L D
′ ∨D(t)
Every formula in Λ(t) ∨ C(v) is of the form Bm, specifically,
(A(si(v1(e)))→ A(v1(e))) ∨ (A(v1(e))→ A(v2(e))) ∨ · · · ∨ (A(vm(e))→A(e)).
Since for each i ≤ r, A(si(v1(e)))→A(v1(e)) ∈ Λ(t), Λ(t)∨C(v) is the set of all
disjunctions
m+1∨
i=1
(A(wi(e))→ A(wi+1(e))
where w = siv for some i ≤ r. As every length m + 1 word is of this form for
some length m word v, repeating this process for all lengthm words v thus yields
Γ,Γ′,Γ(Tm),Λm+1,Π(e) ⊢L D
′ ∨
∨
t∈Tm
D(t)
As we’ve seen, a formula in Λm is of the form Bm, so in L+Bm, we have
Γ,Γ(T1), . . . ,Γ(Tm−1),Π(e) ⊢L
m∨
i=1
∨
t∈Ti−1
D(t)
Thus, the claim follows by taking T = {e} ∪ Tm−1.
If e is a τ -term, the proof proceeds analogously. The resulting formulas in
Λ(e) are then of the form (Am → Am+1) ∨ · · · ∨ (A1 → A2) which is equivalent
to Bm. ⊣
Lemma 8.4. If L ⊢ Lin,
1. L ⊢
∨m
j=1
∧m
i=1(Ai→ Aj)
2. L ⊢
∨m
j=1
∧m
i=1(Aj →Ai)
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Proof. AsGR is axiomatized byH+Lin, it suffices to show that the formulas
are valid in the Go¨del logic based on the truth value set [0, 1]. For (1), in any
given valuation, one of the Aj must be maximal, i.e., Ai → Aj has value 1 in it
for all i. For (2), one of the Aj must be minimal. ⊣
Lemma 8.5. Suppose Γ,Π(e) ⊢L D(e), where Π(e) are the predicative critical
formulas A(uj)→A(e) belonging to e, there are no impredicative critical formulas
belonging to e, and Γ are critical formulas for which e is not critical. Then Π(e)
has a complete e-elimination set.
Proof. First suppose e is an ε-term. Replacing e by uj results in proof
showing
Γ[uj/e],
p∧
i=1
(A(ui)→A(uj)) ⊢L D(uj)
If we applying Lemma 7.5(1), we get
⋃
j
Γ[uj/e],
p∨
j=1
p∧
i=1
(A(ui)→A(uj)) ⊢L
∨
j
D(uj)
The disjunction of conjunctions on the left is provable in L + Lin by
Lemma 8.4(1).
If e is a τ -term, we get
⋃
j
Γ[uj/e],
p∨
j=1
p∧
i=1
(A(uj)→ A(ui)) ⊢L
∨
j
D(uj)
and the claim follows by Lemma 8.4(2). ⊣
Theorem 8.6. If L ⊢ Bm for some m, then Lετ has complete e-elimination
sets.
Proof. Suppose Γ,Π(e),∆(e) ⊢L D(e), where Π(e) are the predicative crit-
ical formulas belonging to e, ∆(e) the impredicative formulas belonging to
e, and Γ are critical formulas for which e is not critical. By Lemma 8.3,
Γ[T ],Π(e) ⊢L
∨
t∈T D(t) where T = {e} ∪ Tm−1. Since L+Bm ⊢ Lin by Propo-
sition 6.4, Lemma 8.5 applies and so
⋃
j T [uj/e] is a complete e-elimination
set. ⊣
Remark 8.7. Note that C = LC2, so the results of this section provide alter-
nate methods for computing e-elimination sets for classical logic.
§9. The Hilbert-Bernays Elimination Procedure. Recall that the chal-
lenges in the proof of the first ετ -theorem include, in addition to the existence
of complete elimination sets, guarantees that the new sets Γ[si/e] are in fact
critical formulas (so eliminating a set Λ(e) of critical formulas yields a correct
Lετ -proof), and that the process eventually terminates. We now discuss the
method used by Hilbert and Bernays in the original proof of the first ε-theorem
to ensure this.
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Definition 9.1. Suppose ⊢pi1Lετ D1. A sequence 〈Λ1(e1), T1〉, . . . , 〈Λk(ek), Tk〉
of sets Λi(ei) of critical formulas belonging to ei and is an ετ-elimination sequence
if for each i:
1. Γi,Λ
′(e),Λi(ei) ⊢
pii
Lετ Di, where Λ
′(e) are the critical formulas for ei not in
Λi(ei) and Γi the remaining critical formulas in πi,
2. Ti is an ei-elimination set for πi and Λi(ei)
3. Γi+1 = Γi[Ti/ei] and Di+1 =
∨
t∈Ti
Di[t/ei],
4. Γi contains only critical formulas, and
5. Γi+1 ⊢Lετ Di+1
and Γk+1 = ∅, that is, L ⊢pik+1 Dk+1. If all Λ′(ei) = ∅ (i.e., Ti is a complete
elimination set for ei), we say the sequence is a complete elimination sequence.
An ετ -elimination sequence, then, is a sequence of ετ -terms ei and sets of
critical formulas Λ(ei) belonging to it, such that eliminating Λi(ei) from proof πi
results in a new proof πi+1 of a disjunction of instances of D(ei) from instances
of the critical formulas for which ei is not critical and the remaining critical
formlas belonging to ei. Since the definition requires πi to be an ετ -proof, the
formulas in Γ[Ti] must here actually be critical formulas.
If an ετ -elimination sequence exists for a formula E and its ετ -proof π0, then
the first ετ -theorem holds for E.
Proposition 9.2. Suppose π is an Lετ proof of E(u1, . . . , un) where
E(x1, . . . , xn) is ετ-free. Suppose furthermore that an ετ-elimination sequence
exists for π. Then there are tuples of terms ti1, . . . , tin such that L ⊢∨l
i=1E(ti1, . . . , tin).
Proof. Since E(x1, . . . , xn) is ετ -free, E(ti1, . . . , tin)[s/e] ≡
E(ti1[s/e], . . . , tin[s/e]). The result follows by induction on k, the length
of the ετ -elimination sequence for π. ⊣
For the proof of the first ετ -theorem, then, it is sufficient to show that suitable
e-elimination sets always exist and ετ -terms e and sets of associated critical
formulas can be successively chosen in such a way as to yield an ετ -elimination
sequence for π1. Hilbert and Bernays did this by defining a well-ordering of
ετ -terms which guarantees that eliminating maximal ετ -terms according to this
ordering guarantees that the Γ[Ti] are again critical formulas, and no larger
(in the ordering) critical ετ -terms are newly introduced. The ordering is the
lexicographic order on two complexity measures of ετ -terms, the rank and degree.
Definition 9.3. An ετ -term e is nested in an ετ -term e′ if e is a proper
subterm of e, i.e., if every occurrence of a variable which is free in e is also free
in e′.
Definition 9.4. The degree deg(e) of an ετ -term e is defined as follows:
1. deg(e) = 1 iff e contains no nested ετ -terms.
2. deg(e) = max{deg(e1), . . . , deg(en)} + 1 if e1, . . . , en are all the ετ -terms
nested in e.
For convenience, let deg(t) = 0 if t is not an ετ -term.
Definition 9.5. An ετ -term e is subordinate to an ετ -term e′ = εxA(x) if e
occurs in e′ and x is free in e.
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Definition 9.6. The rank rk(e) of an ετ -term e is defined as follows:
1. rk(e) = 1 iff e contains no subordinate ετ -terms.
2. rk(e) = max{rk(e1), . . . , rk(en)} + 1 if e1, . . . , en are all the ετ -terms
subordinate to e.
Lemma 9.7. If e is a substitution instance of e′, rk(e) = rk(e′).
Lemma 9.8. Suppose e is an ετ-term, t any term, and C is a critical formula
for which e is not critical of rank not greater than that of e. Then C[t/e] is a
critical formula;
Proof. Suppose C ≡ B(s) → B(εy B(y)). If e is a subterm of C, it is a
subterm of B(y) or of s. To see this, note that, first, e cannot be a subterm of
B(εy B(y)) without being a subterm of B(y), since e is not critical for C and so
we have e 6≡ εy B(y).
Second, if e were a subterm of B(s) but not of B(y) or of s, we would have
B(s) ≡ B′(e′(s)) and so B(y) ≡ B′(e′(y)) for e′(y) some ετ -term such that
e ≡ e′(s). Consequently, e′ ≡ εxA′(x, y) and e ≡ εxA′(x, s).
But now εy B(y) is of the form εy B
′(εxA
′(x, y)). The rank of εxA
′(x, y)
is the same as the rank of e ≡ εxA′(x, s), but εy A′(x, y) is subordinate to
εy B
′(εxA
′(x, y)), i.e., εy B(y). Thus, εy B(y) has higher rank than e, contrary
to assumption.
So e is a subterm of B(y) or of s. We can write B(y) as B′(y, e), s as s(e),
and B(s) as B′(s(e), e). Then C[t/e] is
B′(s(t), t)→ B′(εy B
′(y, t), t)
which is a critical formula. (The same applies if C is a formula critical for a
τ -term.) ⊣
Lemma 9.9. Suppose e is an ετ-term, t any term, and C is a critical formula
for which e is not critical of rank not greater than that of e, and if of the same
rank, not of higher degree. Then C[t/e] is not of higher rank than e, and if it is
of the same rank it is not of higher degree.
Proof. We have seen that e can occur as a subterm in C only as a subterm of
s alone, or as a subterm of B(y). In the former case, C[t/e] is B(s′)→B(εy B(y)),
and the critical ετ -term of C[t/e] is the same as that of C. By assumption, e is
a critical ετ -term of maximal degree among those of maximal rank.
In the latter case, e is a nested subterm of εy B(y). Since εy B(y) is of higher
degree than its subterm e, εy B(y) must be of lower rank than e by assumption.
Rank is preserved under replacement of nested subterms, so [εy B(y)][t/e] has
the same rank as εy B(y) and consequently lower rank than e. ⊣
Proposition 9.10. Suppose π is an Lετ proof of E(u1, . . . , un) where
E(x1, . . . , xn) is ετ-free. Suppose furthermore that for every Lετ proof and crit-
ical ετ-term e there is a complete e-elimination set. Then there is a complete
ετ-elimination sequence for π.
Proof. Take π0 = π. Suppose πi has been defined. Let ei be a critical
ετ -term of πi of maximal degree among the critical terms of maximal rank.
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Let Λi(ei) be all critical formulas belonging to ei, and Γi the remaining critical
formulas. We have
Γi,Λi(ei) ⊢Lετ Di
By assumption, there is a complete e-elimination set Ti for Λi(ei) and so we have
πi+1 showing that
Γi[Ti] ⊢Lετ
∨
t∈Ti
Di[t/ei]
Each critical formula C in Γi is not of higher rank than ei, and if it is of equal
rank it is not of higher degree. So by Lemma 9.8, C[t/ei] is a critical formulas.
Hence πi+1 is a correct Lετ -proof. Let Γi+1 = Γi[Ti] and Di+1 ≡
∨
t∈Ti
Di[t/ei].
Eventually, Γi = ∅, since in each step, by Lemma 9.9, the maximal rank
of critical ετ -terms in Γi does not increase, the maximal degree of critical ετ -
terms of maximal rank does not increase, and the number of critical ετ -terms of
maximal degree among those of maximal rank decreases. ⊣
Corollary 9.11. The first ετ-theorem holds for C.
Proof. By Proposition 7.7, every critical ετ -term has complete elimination
sets. So by Proposition 9.10, there always is an elimination sequence. The first
ετ -theorem follows by Proposition 9.2. ⊣
Remark 9.12. The traditional procedure following the Hilbert-Bernays order,
which eliminates all critical formulas belonging to a maximal ετ -term together,
is not the only possible procedure that guarantees termination. Despite the fact
that, pointed out in Remark 7.8, using Proposition 7.6 for all critical formulas
belonging to a single ετ -term results in a larger disjunction than Proposition 7.7,
the ability in the classical case to eliminate single critical formulas provides
flexibility that can be exploited to produce smaller overall Herbrand disjunctions.
As Baaz, Leitsch, and Lolic [2018, Theorem 3] show, there are sequences of ετ -
proofs where the original procedure produces Herbrand disjunctions that are
non-elementarily larger than a more efficient elimination order.
Theorem 9.13. The first ετ-theorem holds for negated formulas in any Lετ
such that L ⊢ J , e.g., KCετ and LCετ .
Proof. L has complete e-elimination sets for negated end-formulas by Propo-
sition 7.9. Note that J , i.e., ¬A∨¬¬A, follows intuitionistically from (A→¬A)∨
(¬A→A), which is an instance of Lin. So LC ⊢ J . ⊣
Theorem 9.14. The first ετ-theorem holds for LCmετ .
Proof. By Theorem 8.6. ⊣
Theorem 9.15. The first ετ-theorem holds in LCετ for ετ-free formulas.
Proof. If LCετ ⊢ D then also LCmετ ⊢ D. Since D is ετ -free, by Theo-
rem 9.14, LCm ⊢ D. In general LC ⊢ D iff LCm ⊢ D for all m, so the claim
follows. ⊣
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§10. Herbrand’s Theorem and the Second Epsilon-Theorem. The
first ετ -theorem implies Herbrand’s theorem for purely existential formulas.
If E ≡ ∃x1 . . . ∃xnE′(x1, . . . , xn) is provable in predicate logic, then so is
Eετ ≡ E′(e1, . . . , en) for some ε-terms e1, . . . , en. From the first ε-theorem
we then obtain a proof in propositional logic of a Herbrand disjunction
E′(t11, . . . , tn1) ∨ . . . ∨ A(t1k, . . . , tnk)
for some terms tij . In predicate logic, we may now successively introduce existen-
tial quantifiers to obtain the original formula E. This holds in any intermediate
predicate logic in which the first ετ -theorem holds, since the only principles used
in the last step (proving E from its Herbrand disjunction) are A(t)→∃xA(x) and
∃x(A(x)∨B)→ (∃xA(x)∨B), (x not free in B) which already hold in intuition-
istic logic. (Despite the failure of the first ετ -theorem in LCετ , the Herbrand
theorem for existential formulas does hold in QLC; see Aschieri [2017]).
For classical predicate logic, the Herbrand theorem for existential formulas
implies the Herbrand theorem for prenex formulas. If a prenex formula E has a
proof in first-order logic, so does its (purely existential) Herbrand form H(E) =
∃x1 . . . ∃xnE′(x1, . . . , xn). In classical predicate logic, we can obtain not just
H(E) from its Herbrand disjunction, but also the original prenex formula E.
This requires that we introduce not just existential quantifiers, but also universal
quantifiers. Consequently, we need not just the generalization rule A(x)/∀xA(x)
but also a principle that allows us to shift universal quantifiers over disjunctions,
viz.,
∀x(A(x) ∨B)→ (∀xA(x) ∨B). (CD)
This principle is not intuitionistically valid: it characterizes Kripke frames with
constant domains. Since the implication E→H(E) already holds in intuitionistic
logic, any intermediate predicate logic in which CD holds and which has the first
ε-theorem also has Herbrand’s theorem for prenex formulas.
Although the first ε-theorem implies Herbrand’s theorem for prenex formulas
(at least if CD is present), the converse is not true. As we showed, the first ετ -
theorem does holds for an intermediate predicate logic only if its propositional
fragment provesBm for somem. In particular, it does not hold for infinite-valued
first-order Go¨del logics GR. However, Herbrand’s theorem for prenex formulas
does hold for GR Baaz, Preining, and Zach [2007, Theorem 7.8]. (Incidentally,
the Herbrand theorem for prenex formulas also holds in intuitionistic logic despite
the invalidity of CD ; see Bowen [1976]).
In classical logic, the second ε-theorem can be proved using the first one as
follows: Suppose Cετ ⊢ Aετ . Since A is equivalent to a prenex formula PA in
classical logic, we have QC ⊢ A→ PA. Prenex formulas imply their Herbrand
forms, i.e., QC ⊢ PA → H(PA). Together we have QC ⊢ A→ H(PA) and by
translating into the ετ -calculus, Cετ ⊢ Aετ →H(PA)ετ , so Cετ ⊢ H(PA)ετ . By
the first ετ -theorem, H(PA) has a Herbrand disjunction, from which (in QC)
we can prove PA and hence A.
The steps that may fail in an intermediate prediate logic QL, other than
the first ετ -theorem, are the provability of A↔ PA and proving PA from the
Herbrand disjunction of H(PA). These steps do work provided all quantifier
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shifts can be can be carried out (i.e., in addition to CD also the formulas Q∀
and Q∃). Thus, if Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, any intermediate predicate QL
with propositional fragment L in which all quantifier shifts are provable also has
the second ετ -theorem.
Proposition 10.1. If QL is an intermediate predicate logic with propositional
fragment L, QL proves CD, Q∃, and Q∀, and Lετ has the first ετ-theorem, it
also has the second ετ-theorem.
Proof. Suppose Lετ ⊢ Aετ . The ετ -calculus proves ετ -translations of all
quantifier shifts, so Lετ ⊢ (AP )ετ , and since QH ⊢ AP → H(AP ) also Lετ ⊢
(H(AP ))ετ . By the first ετ -theorem for Lετ , there is a Herbrand disjunction A′
so that L ⊢ A′. Since QL ⊢ CD , QL ⊢ AP . Since QL ⊢ Q∃ and QL ⊢ Q∀, also
QL ⊢ AP → A, and so QL ⊢ A. ⊣
Infinite-valued first-order Go¨del logic GR is an intermediate prediate logic
which proves CD but not Q∀ or Q∃, and in it the first ετ -theorem does not
hold. The logics of linear Kripke frames with m worlds (and varying domains)
are QLCm. LCmετ has the first ετ -theorem, but does not prove CD . However,
finite-valued first-order Go¨del logics Gm do prove CD , Q∃, and Q∀, and so also
have the second ετ -theorem.
Herbrand’s theorem also yield other results, for instance the following.
Proposition 10.2. Suppose QL1 ⊆ QL2 are intermediate predicate logics
with identical propositional fragment L. If Herbrand’s theorem holds in QL2 for
existential formulas A, then QL1 ⊢ A iff QL2 ⊢ A. The result also holds for
prenex formulas A if QL1 ⊢ CD.
Proof. The “only if” direction is trivial since QL1 ⊆ QL2. For the “only
if” direction, assume QL2 ⊢ A. Then there is a Herbrand disjunction A′ of A
provable in L and hence in QL1. Since QH ⊢ A
′→ A, also QL1 ⊢ A.
Now suppose in addition that QL1 ⊢ CD and QL2 ⊢ A with A prenex.
Then since QH ⊢ A→ H(A), QL2 ⊢ H(A). By Herbrand’s theorem there is
a Herbrand disjunction A′ and L ⊢ A′. From A′, QL1 can prove A, using just
intuitionistically valid inferences as well as CD . ⊣
Since infinite-valued Go¨del logic GR has Herbrand’s theorem, the existential
fragments of QLC and GR agree. Whenever the first ετ -theorem holds for Lετ ,
Herbrand’s theorem for existential formulas also holds for any predicate logic
containing L. So, whenever an intermediate predicate logic QL1 ⊆ QL2, their
propositional fragment L are the same, and Lετ has the first ετ -theorem, their
purely existential fragments agree. For instance, the result holds for QLCm and
its extensions (e.g., by the constant domain axiom CD) for existential formulas.
By similar reasoning, the result holds for formulas of the form ∃~x¬A(~x) for
KC and its extensions. By Proposition 6.7, the result can also be extended to
formulas of the form ∀~y B(~y)→∃~xA(~x).
§11. Elimination of Critical Formulas using Lin. In the classical case,
the first ε-theorem is obtained by successively eliminating critical formulas be-
longing to a single ε-term using excluded middle. In intermediate logics this is
not available, but as we have seen in the proof of Theorem 8.6, critical formulas
THE FIRST EPSILON THEOREM IN INTERMEDIATE LOGICS 29
can also be eliminated using Bm and Lin . And in fact, if a critical ετ -term e
has only predicative critical formulas then it has a complete e-elimination set
(by Lemma 8.5) already in LC, since only Lin is required to eliminate predica-
tive critical formulas. Thus, the procedure of the first ετ -theorem terminates
for all ετ -proofs in which no impredicative critical formulas occurs during the
successive elimination of critical formulas.
Proposition 11.1. If LCετ ⊢ E(u1, . . . , un) and there is an elimination
sequence 〈πi,Λi(ei), Ti〉 in which each formula in Λi(ei) is predicative, then
LC ⊢
∨
E(ti1, . . . , tin).
Proof. By Proposition 9.2, since if in each step of the elimination sequence
the eliminated critical formulas are all predicative, the elimination already works
in LC by Lemma 8.5. ⊣
So if there is a way to select critical ετ -terms ei successively for elimination in
such way that the critical formulas belonging to ei are always predicative, the
first ετ -theorem holds in LCετ for a particular proof π. However, it is hard to
determine just by inspecting π if this is possible. For one, it is not sufficient
that the critical formulas in π itself are all predicative: eliminating the critical
formulas belonging to one critical ετ -term may turn a remaining predicative
critical formula into an impredicative one. For instance, consider
E(x, y) ≡ (A(f(y))→ A(x)) ∧ (B(g(x))→ B(y))
eA ≡ εxA(x)
eB ≡ εy B(y)
Then D(eA, eB) has an LCετ proof, since it is the conjunction of the critical
formulas
A(f(eB))→ A(eA)
B(g(eA))→ B(eB)
which are both predicative. If we first eliminate eA we would replace eA by f(eB)
in the second, resulting in
B(g(f(eB))→B(eB)
which is impredicative. Similarly, eliminating eB leaves the impredicative
A(f(g(eA))→ A(eA).
So no elimination sequence resulting in only predicative critical formulas at every
step is possible.
Of course, if the term t in a critical formula A(t)→A(e) contains no ετ -term at
all, it is predicative, and replacing some ετ -term e′ in it by a term t′ cannot result
in an impredicative critical formula. Let us call such critical formulas weak.
Definition 11.2. A critical formulaA(t)→A(εxA(x)) resp.A(τxA(x))→A(t)
is weak in π if t does not contain any critical ε- or τ -term of π.
If the critical formulas in π are all weak, there is an elimination sequence.
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Proposition 11.3. Suppose LCετ ⊢ E(e1, . . . , en) with a proof in which
all critical formulas are weak. Then there are terms tji such that LC ⊢∨
j E(t
j
1, . . . , t
j
n).
Proof. Take a critical ετ -term e of maximum degree among those of maximal
rank in π, let Γ(e) be the critical formulas belonging to e, Γ the remaining
critical formulas, and suppose the edn-formula isD(e). Since all criticial formulas
A(u)→ A(e) (or A(e)→ A(u)) are weak, e does not occur in u, i.e., all critical
formulas in Γ(e) are predicative. By Lemma 8.5, e has an e-elimination set T ,
and correspondingly Γ[T ] ⊢LC
∨
tD(t). However, since the critical formulas in
Γ are also weak, they do not contain e, hence Γ[T ] = Γ. The result follows by
the same inductive proof as the first ετ -theorem. ⊣
The first ετ -theorem guarantees the existence of Herbrand disjunctions for
existential theorems, i.e., if E ≡ ∃x1 . . . xnD(x1, . . . , xn) and ⊢ E then ⊢∨
iD(t1i, . . . , tni). The existence of a Herbrand disjunction, conversely, guaran-
tees the existence of a proof of Eετ for which a predicative elimination sequence
exists.
Proposition 11.4. If ⊢
∨
iD(t1i, . . . , tni) then there is an ετ-derivation of
[∃x1∃˙xnD(x1, . . . , xn)]ετ for which a predicative elimination sequence exists.
Proof. We give an example only. Suppose LC ⊢ D(s1, t1)∨D(s2, t2). First,
consider
e(x) ≡ εyD(x, y)
Then both
C1(e(s1)) ≡ D(s1, t1)→D(s1, e(s1))
C2(e(s2)) ≡ D(s2, t1)→D(s2, e(s2))
are predicative critical formulas. Since LC ⊢ D(s1, t1) ∨ D(s2, t2) we get from
them D(s1, e(s1)) ∨D(s2, s2). Now let
e′ ≡ εxD(x, e(x)).
C3(e
′) ≡ D(s1, e(s1))→D(e
′, e(e′))
C4(e
′) ≡ D(s2, e(s2))→D(e
′, e(e′))
are also predicative critical formulas. Together we have a proof of D(e′, e(e′)) ≡
[∃x∃yD(x, y)]ετ . Then
〈{C3(e
′), C4(e
′)}, {s1, s2}〉
〈{C(1(e(s1)))}, {t1}〉
〈{C(2(e(s2)))}, {t2}〉
is an elimination sequence. In fact it is an elimination sequence following
Hilbert’s ordering, since e′ has higher rank than e(s1) and e(s2). In each step,
only predicative critical formulas are generated. It produces the original Her-
brand disjunction. ⊣
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§12. The First ετ-Theorem and Order Induction. In arithmetic, the
usual methods for eliminating critial formulas based on the first ε-theorem do
not work; and so consistency proofs for systems based on the ε-calculus there
use other methods such as the ε-substitution method (see Ackermann [1940] and
Moser [2006]; the history of the two approaches is discussed in Zach [2004]). The
methods developed for the first ε-theorem to eliminate predicative critical formu-
las from proofs in LCετ above can, however, also be applied in classical theories
of order (including arithmetic). Suppose T is a universal theory involving a
relation <, and consider the order induction rule IR<,
∀x(x < y→ A(x))→A(y)
IR<
A(t)
We denote by ⊢< the derivability relation generated by classical logic extended
by IR<. The resulting system is equivalent to adding to classical first-order logic
the order induction principle for <,
∀y((∀x(x < y→A(x))→ A(y))→∀z A(z). (IP<)
Proposition 12.1. T ⊢< A iff T + IP< ⊢ A
Proof. The “only if” direction follows by observing that if
T ⊢ ∀x(x < y→ A(x))→A(y) then also
T ⊢ ∀y(∀x(x < y→A(x))→ A(y))
and so A(t) follows from IP< and ∀xA(x)→ A(t) by modus ponens. For the
“if” direction, let PA be
∀y(∀x(x < y→A(x))→ A(y))
Then by logic,
⊢ ∀u(u < v→ A(u))→ (PA →A(v)) and so
⊢ ∀u(u < v→ (PA →A(u)))→ (PA → A(v))
⊢< PA→ A(z) by IR<, and so
⊢< PA→∀z A(z)
Thus, ⊢< IP<. ⊣
Now consider the classical ε-calculus extended by critical formulas of the form
A(t)→¬t < εxA(x)
These critical formulas are obviously equivalent to Hilbert’s “critical formulas
of the second form,” A(t)→ εxA(x) ≤ t, over a theory that proves that < is
trichotomous. If A is derivable from T and ordinary critical formulas for ε-terms
and critical formulas of this second kind, we write T ⊢<ε A. The standard
translation Aε of a formula A is defined as in Definition 3.3, except ∀xA(x)ε =
Aε(εx ¬A
ε(x)). Then we can show:
Proposition 12.2. If T ⊢< A then T ε ⊢<ε Aε.
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Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.4. We just have to deal with application
of IR<. Suppose we have a derivation of the ε-translation of the premise of IR<,
(e(y) < y→ Aε(e(y))→ Aε(y)
where e(y) ≡ εx ¬(x < y → Aε(x)) is the ε-term used in the translation of
∀x(x < y→ A(x)). By substituting e′ ≡ εz ¬A
ε(z) for y throughout the proof,
we obtain
(e(e′) < e′→Aε(e(e′))→ Aε(e′)
Take the critical formula of second kind ¬Aε(t) → ¬t < εz ¬Aε(z) and let t
be e(e′). By contraposition, we have
e(e′) < e′→ Aε(e(e′)) and so
Aε(e′)
by modus ponens. The conclusion of IR<, A
ε(t), now follows from an ordinary
critical formula belonging to ¬Aε(z), viz.,
¬Aε(t)→¬Aε(e′).
⊣
Arithmetic does not have a Herbrand theorem, and thus also no first ε-
theorem. However, Herbrand disjunctions exists for formulas ∃~xE(~x) iff the crit-
ical formulas belonging to the ε-terms e1, . . . , en in the standard ε-translation
Eε(e1, . . . , en) of ∃x1 . . .∃xn E(x1, . . . , xn) can be eliminated by a predicative
elimination sequence. This mirrors the situation in LC discussed in Section 11.
The proof that critical formulas can be eliminated if a predicative elimination
sequence exists is similar. Corresponding to Lemma 8.4 we’ll need the following:
Lemma 12.3. Let V be a finite set of variables and assume that
T ⊢ ∀x¬x < x (Irr)
T ⊢ ∀x∀y∀z((x < y→ (y < z→ x < z)) (Trans)
Then T ⊢
∨
x∈V
∧
y∈V ¬y < x.
Proof. Suppose not. Then T +
∧
x∈V
∨
y∈V y < x would be satisfiable. Let
M and s be the corresponding structure and variable assignment. Fix x1 ∈ V .
Since M, s |=
∨
y∈V y < x1, for some x2 ∈ V , s(x2) <
M s(x1). Continuing,
we obtain x1, . . . , xn such that s(xi+1) <
M s(xi) for any n. Since V is finite,
eventually xi ≡ xi+k, contradicting the assumption that any model of T makes
< irreflexive and transitive. ⊣
Theorem 12.4. Suppose T is as in Lemma 12.3. Then T ⊢∨k
i=1E(t1i, . . . , tni) for some terms tij iff there is a derivation of E
ε(e1, . . . , en)
which has a predicative elimination sequence.
Proof. For the “only if” part, proceed as in the procedure outlined in the
proof of Proposition 11.4. For the “if” part, we have to show that if the critical
formulas belonging to an ε-term are predicative, they can be eliminated. Without
loss of generality we may assume that for each term ti, a corresponding critical
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formula of first and of second kind are both present. So suppose e is a critical
ε-term and Θ,Γ,Π(e),Π′(e) ⊢<ε D(e) where Π(e) and and Π′(e) consist of,
respectively,
A(t1)→ A(e), . . . , A(tm)→A(e)
A(t1)→¬t1 < e, . . . , A(tm)→¬tm < e,
and Θ consists of instances of formulas in T .
Let W = {t1, . . . , tm}. If V ⊆W , let CV be
∧
t∈V
A(t) ∧
∧
t∈W\V
¬A(t)
and let ΠV (e) be the critical formulas with terms ti ∈ V and ΠW\V (e) = Π(e) \
ΠV (e), and similarly for Π
′
V (e) and Π
′
T\V (e). Since ¬A(t) ⊢ A(t)→B, we have
CV ⊢ ΠW\V (e) and CV ⊢ Π
′
W\V (e), and so
Θ,Γ, CV ,ΠV (e),Π
′
V (e) ⊢<ε D(e)
Since the critical formulas in Π(e) are predicative, ti does not contain e and so
CV [ti/e] = CV . Since CV ⊢ A(ti) for every ti ∈ V , CV ⊢ ΠV (ti). So we also
have
Θ[ti/e],Γ[ti/e], CV ,Π
′
V (ti) ⊢<ε D(ti)
for each ti ∈ V and consequently
Θ[V ],Γ[V ], CV ,
∨
t∈V
∧
u∈V
(A(u)→¬u < t) ⊢<ε
∨
t∈V
D(ti)
Since this is true for every V ⊆W , we get
Θ[V ],Γ[W ],
∨
V⊆W
CV ,Ξ ⊢<ε
∨
t∈W
D(ti)
if we let Ξ = {BV : V ⊆ W} where BV is
∨
t∈V
∧
u∈V (A(u)→ ¬u < t). Now∨
V⊆W CV is itself provable in classical logic. So as the result of one elimination
step, we get
Θ[V ],Γ[W ],Ξ ⊢<ε
∨
t∈W
D(ti)
If there is a predicative elimination sequence, we have in the end terms tij such
that
Θ′,Ξ′ ⊢<ε
k∨
i=1
E(t1i, . . . , tni)
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where Θ′ are all the instances of formulas of T produced in the elimination, and
Ξ′ are all the formulas of the form BV , possibly with epsilon terms replaced by
other terms. T ⊢ A for each A ∈ Θ′. By Lemma 12.3,
T ⊢
∨
t∈V
∧
u∈V
¬u < t
and so each formula BV ∈ Ξ
′ is also provable from T . Together we have,
T ⊢
k∨
i=1
E(t1i, . . . , tni)
⊣
§13. Open Problems. We have investigated the ετ -calculi for intermediate
logics, with a focus on the first ετ -theorem. We showed that the only intermedi-
ate logics with an unrestriced first ετ -theorem are the finite-valued Go¨del ogics
LCm, but obtained partial results for formulas of specific form or with specific
kinds of proofs.
The natural next question to investigate is the second ε-theorem, i.e., to inves-
tigate extended ετ -calculi for intermediate predicate logics and characterize those
logics for which the extended ετ -calculus is conservative. We have shown that
Lετ proves all quantifier shifts, so Lετ is not conservative over any QL where
these are not provable. Note that this question is not automatically settled by
the answer to the question of which logics have the first ετ -theorem. Rather, it is
a question orthogonal and requires other proof systems for a proper investigation,
such as sequent calculi for ετ -terms. For instance, Aguilera and Baaz [2019, The-
orem 5.4] that the standard translation Γ⇒ Dε of a sequent Γ⇒ D is provable
in a sequent calculus LJε for intuitionistic logic iff Γ ⇒ D is provable in a spe-
cial version LJ++ of intuitionistic sequent calculus which is globally sound but
allows violation of the eigenvariable condition. LJ++ in turn proves Γ ⇒ D iff
LJ + CD + Q∀ + Q∃ ⊢ Γ ⇒ D (Proposition 4.4). In other words, the second
ε-theorem holds for intutionistic predicate logic with all quantifier shifts. The
methods used here are closely related to the study of the behavior of skolem
functions in intermediate logics (of which ετ -terms are in many ways a syntac-
tic variant), see, e.g., Iemhoff [2019]. As mentioned in the introduction, other
approaches to adding ε-operators to intuitionistic logic yield systems that are
conservative over the original logic. Work on skolemization in intuitionistic logic
is relevant here, and suggests that conservative ε-calculi can be obtained by in-
troducing existence predicates. The proof-theoretic approaches in the literature
would benefit also from a complementary model-theoretic study. A Kripke-style
semantics for ετ -terms, with or without existence predicate, is still lacking (but
see DeVidi [1995] for a semantics based on Heyting algebras).
In Section 11 we gave sufficient conditions for when ετ -terms can be eliminated
from a proof π in LCετ . Are there better (weaker) criteria that apply to more
proofs? For instance, there may be certain kinds of orderings such that if the
critical ετ -terms in π and corresponding “witness terms” can be put into such
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an ordering, an elimination sequence in which only predicative critical formulas
exists.
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§14. Appendix: Bell and DeVidi on intuitionistic ετ-calculi. Bell
[1993] pointed out that if ∀xA(x) is axiomatically defined as A(εx ¬A(x)), then
the intuitionistically invalid formula
¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x) (Q)
becomes provable if we add critical ε-formulas to intuitionistic first-order
logicQH as well as the axioms ∀xA(x)↔A(εx ¬A(x)) and ∃xA(x)↔A(εxA(x)).
This remains true if we consider a pure ε-calculus for intuitionistic logic and
translate ∀xA(x) as A(εx ¬A(x)). For the translation of ¬∀xA(x) and ∃x¬A(x)
would then coincide: ¬A(εx ¬A(x)). However, the corresponding critical formula
A(εx ¬A(x))→ A(t) is not derivable. This is the reason we add the τ operator,
and translate ∀xA(x) as A(τx A(x)). As DeVidi [1995, Theorem 4] pointed out,
QH with the addition of critical τ -formulas also proves Q. This remains the
case in the pure ετ -calculus for intuitionistic logic: Hετ ⊢ Qετ . For Qετ is
¬A(τx A(x))→ ¬A(εx ¬A(x)), which is a critical ε-formula. This means that
the translations of all four ¬-quantifier shifts are provable in Hετ , as the other
three,
∀x¬A(x)→¬∃xA(x)
¬∃xA(x)→∀¬xA(x)
∃x¬A(x)→¬∀xA(x)
are already intuitionistically valid. What does this mean for the interdefinability
of quantifiers in ετ -calculi based on intutionistic logic? In intuitionistic logic
alone, Q does not yield
¬∀x¬A(x)↔∃xA(x)
but only
¬∀x¬A(x)→∃x¬¬A(x).
Likewise, in QH, we only have
¬∃x¬A(x)→∀x¬¬A(x).
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In the same paper, Bell claims to have shown that the intuitionistic ε-calculus
is not conservative over H (with identity). The proof, however, requires addi-
tional assumptions, i.e., it is not claimed for pure intuitionistic logic. Specifically,
the claim is that D ⊢QHετ M where M is
¬(B ∧ C)→ (¬B ∨ ¬C) (M)
and where where D is ∀x(x = a ∨ ¬x = a). M is an intuitionistically invalid
direction of De Morgan’s laws. Since the shadow Ds of D is the (obviously
intuitionistically valid) ⊤ ∨ ¬⊤, this seems to contradict Lemma 5.2.
The proof proceeds as follows: Let A(x) be (x = a ∧B) ∨ (x 6= a ∧C). Then,
⊢QH ∀xA(x)→ (B ∧ C) (*)
and consequently, by intuitionistically valid contraposition
⊢QH ¬(B ∧ C)→¬∀xA(x) (**)
Furthermore, by the intuitionistically valid De Morgan law ¬(E∨F )→(¬E∧¬F ),
⊢QH ∃x¬A(x)→∃x[¬(x = a ∧B) ∧ ¬(x 6= a ∧ C)]
Since in H, ¬(E ∧ F )→ (E→¬F ), we get
⊢QH ∃x¬A(x)→∃x[(x = a→¬B) ∧ (x 6= a→¬C)]
As D is ∀x(x = a ∨ x 6= a), this gives,
D ⊢QH ∃x¬A(x)→¬B ∨ ¬C (***)
Now in the ετ -calculus for intuitionistic logic, we have
⊢QHετ ¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x)
which gives us, with (**) and (***), De Morgan’s law M ,
D ⊢QHετ ¬(B ∧C)→ (¬B ∨ ¬C)
The problem with this argument is that (*) is false. In fact,
∀x[(x = a ∧B) ∨ (x 6= a ∧ C)]→ (B ∧ C)
is not true in any one-element model when C is false. (Theorem 7 of DeVidi [1995]
fails for the same reason; the assumption a 6= b is required.)
Bell provides another proof of M in intuitionistic ε-calculus without invok-
ing Q, but this requires, in addition to D, the assumption a 6= b. DeVidi [1995]
shows that in the intuitionistic ετ -calculus, D ∧ a 6= b derives Lin .8 However,
since the shadow of a 6= b is ¬⊤, this proof does not conflict with our Lemma 5.2.
Bell’s other examples of intuitionistically invalid propositional formulas provable
in ετ -calculi all require assumptions of the form a 6= b and also the axiom of
ε-extensionality. The examples of derivations of M and Lin in intuitionistic
ετ -calculus given by Mulvihill [2015] avoid identity but require the assumptions
∀x((P (x)→ P (a)) ∨ ¬(P (x)→ P (a))) and ¬(P (a)→ P (b)).
8This suggests that the ετ -calculus forces linearity. Note that also LC ⊢M .
